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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we aim to understand what makes replay spoofing de-
tection difficult in the context of the ASVspoof 2017 corpus. We
use FFT spectra, mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) and
inverted MFCC (IMFCC) frontends and investigate different back-
ends based on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), Gaussian
Mixture Models (GMMs) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs).
On this database, we find that IMFCC frontend based systems show
smaller equal error rate (EER) for high quality replay attacks but
higher EER for low quality replay attacks in comparison to the base-
line. However, we find that it is not straightforward to understand the
influence of an acoustic environment (AE), a playback device (PD)
and a recording device (RD) of a replay spoofing attack. One reason
is the unavailability of metadata for genuine recordings. Second, it
is difficult to account for the effects of the factors: AE, PD and RD,
and their interactions. Finally, our frame-level analysis shows that
the presence of cues (recording artefacts) in the first few frames of
genuine signals (missing from replayed ones) influence class predic-
tion.
Index Terms— Automatic speaker verification, spoofing detec-
tion, replay attack, spoofing countermeasure.
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) [1] systems aim at verifying
whether a person is who they claim to be. Recently, ASV technolo-
gies have been widely adopted commercially for user authentication
(eg. mobile phones) [2]. These systems however are vulnerable to-
wards spoofing attacks [3], which involve using artificial/synthetic
speech to bypass the ASV systems of a registered user. The four
common attacks are: (1) text-to-speech; (2) voice conversion; (3)
mimicry; and (4) replay. Thus a spoofing countermeasure is de-
ployed to protect ASV systems from such attacks. It comprises of a
frontend which aims at capturing discriminative attributes from the
speech signal that is used by the backend for classification (often in
binary setting).
Among all, the simplest spoofing approach is the replay attack,
which involves playing pre-recorded speech of a registered user to
the ASV system. Many researchers have explored the vulnerabil-
ity of replay attacks using their in-house databases and protocols,
eg. [4, 5, 6, 7]. These results are often difficult to reproduce which
adds limitation to the growth of anti-spoofing research. However,
with the availability of the ASVspoof 2017 Challenge replay corpus
which has standard protocols and evaluation metrics, research has
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become more transparent and results comparable. Some of the best
reported systems on the version 1.0 corpus used fusion approaches
either at the feature or score level. For example, the best system
[8] used score-level fusion of three different systems (two of which
uses deep neural networks, DNNs) and [9] used score-level fusion of
GMM systems trained on rectangular filter cepstral coefficients and
linear filter cepstral coefficients. Authors in [10] use feature fusion
(constant-Q-cepstral coefficients and high frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients) to train a DNN as a feature extractor. Using the DNN features
they further train a binary SVM for replay spoofing detection.
In this paper we explore CNN, GMM and SVM backends for
replay spoofing detection using the ASVspoof 2017 version 2.0 cor-
pus. Motivated from the findings of [11] about ambient and reverber-
ation noise being reliable indicators of replay spoofing detection, we
investigate the use of IMFCC, MFCC and spectrogram frontends.
Next, we analyse the performance of these systems across differ-
ent spoofing conditions (section 2) to understand how the following
factors: acoustic environment, playback and recording devices, in-
fluence spoofing detection. On this database, however, we find it
hard to analyse these factors in isolation for two reasons: (1) Un-
availability of meta-data for genuine recordings; (2) Segregating the
three factors AE, PD and RD from a replayed signal is difficult. Our
further analysis on frame-level energy and log-likelihood distribu-
tions shows existence of the cues in the genuine signals, similar to
the findings of [12] on version 1.0 of the corpus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a back-
ground on the ASVspoof 2017 corpus in the next section. In section
3 we present details of our countermeasures used in this work. We
discuss the results in section 4. We provide performance analysis un-
der different replay conditions in section 5 followed by conclusions
in section 6.
2. THE ASVSPOOF 2017 CORPUS
The ASVspoof 2017 version 1.0 corpus [13] has been released as
a part of the second automatic speaker verification spoofing and
countermeasures challenge [14] designed to foster research in “re-
play spoofing” countermeasures. Post-evaluation, [12] demonstrated
how class predictions could be manipulated using the cues present in
some of the genuine audio recordings of the corpus. Subsequently,
version 2.0 [11] has been released online1 addressing these data
anomalies. Table 1 shows the database statistics. The distribution
of audio files and their class label remains the same in both the
versions. However, significant updates in the replay meta-data have
been made in the new version.
1https://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/3017
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Table 1. Statistics of the ASVspoof 2017 2.0 corpus. RC denotes
replay configurations. Dur: Duration in hours.
Subset # Spk # RC # Genuine # Replay Dur
Train 10 3 1507 1507 2.22
Dev 8 10 760 950 1.44
Eval 24 57 1298 12008 11.94
Total 42 61 3565 14465 15.6
Next we briefly discuss different replay conditions/configurations
that shall be referred throughout the paper. A replay configuration
(RC) comprises of a unique combination of three elements: a
recording device (RD), a playback device (PD) and an acoustic en-
vironment (AE) where the replay is simulated. These three elements
are the factors of interest in a replay attack. In this study we seek to
understand the influence of these factors both in isolation and con-
junction towards replay spoofing attack. The organisers used a total
of 26 different AE, 26 PD and 25 RD to build the ASVspoof 2017
corpus. However, only 61 unique RCs were used to simulate the
replay attacks from a space of 26× 26× 25 possible combinations.
We find one overlapping RC between the training and evaluation
subsets and seven between the development and evaluation subsets.
Each of the replay factors has been grouped into three categories
[11] depending on the level of threat they present to an ASV system.
(1) Low, signifies use of a low quality RD, PD and noisy AE (eg.
balcony) to simulate a replay attack. (2) Medium, signifies use of
a medium quality RD, PD and a medium noise AE (eg. office). (3)
High, indicates the use of a high quality RD, PD and a low noise
AE (eg. studio).
As demonstrated in [11], low quality replay attacks (all AE, PD
and RD are of low quality) are easily detected by any countermea-
sure due to the accumulation of reverberation and background noise
in a replayed signal. On the other hand, high quality replay attacks
(all AE, PD and RD are of high quality) pose greater threats to ASV
systems leaving no trace to be detected by such countermeasures.
3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we discuss the baseline [15, 11] and the systems we
investigated: (1) Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) trained
on spectrograms (2) Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) trained on
MFCC and IMFCCs (3) Support Vector Machines (SVMs) trained
on MFCC i-vectors and IMFCC i-vectors and finally (4) Fusion sys-
tems. We use pooled (train+development) data for training all our
systems except the CNNs. The CNNs are trained on the training
subset and validated using the development subset.
We use the equal error rate (EER) metric to assess our system
performance. We compute the EER using the Bosaris toolkit [16].
3.1. Baseline systems
The original baseline system [15] is a 512-component Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) trained on 29 dimensional constant-q cep-
stral coefficients (CQCC) including the 0th, delta and acceleration
coefficients. Several experiments were carried out by [11] to im-
prove the original baseline system. The best baseline, referred to as
enhanced baseline, applies Cepstral Mean Variance Normalization,
replaces the zeroth coefficient with log energy and uses 19 base
coefficients instead of 29.
3.2. CNN-based systems
First, we investigate two utterance-based end-to-end replay counter-
measures using CNNs. Motivated from [8], we use power spectro-
gram as the input representation to the CNNs. We choose the initial
3 seconds from each audio signal to obtain a consistent2 input repre-
sentation. For this, we replicate the audio samples if the duration is
smaller or truncate the samples to a 3 second duration. We use a 256
point FFT3, and a 16 ms window with a hop size of 10 ms. Thus, our
input to the CNNs is a mean-variance normalized log power spec-
trogram of 300 × 129 (time × frequency) dimension, where time
denotes the number of frames and frequency the number of bins. We
use the Librosa4 library for computing the spectrograms.
We train the network to optimize cross entropy loss between a
genuine and a spoof class. We initialize the network weights us-
ing Xavier initialization [17]. We set all biases to zero. We use the
standard ReLU non-linearity, a learning rate of 1e-4, a batch size of
32, and the ADAM [18] optimizer. We use the TensorFlow [19] for
CNN implementation with early stopping: if the validation loss does
not improve for 30 epochs we abort the training. We use a maxi-
mum of 300 training epochs and choose the model that shows the
best performance on the validation data. We apply different dropout
rates to the inputs of fully connected layers depending on the model
architecture. At inference time, for each test utterance we convert
the posterior probability distribution of the genuine and spoof class
into a log-likelihood ratio (used as a score) and compute the EER.
The architecture of our first CNN system, CNN1, is adapted
from LCNNFFT [8] that showed promising results on the version
1.0 database. It comprises of 5 convolution (Conv) layers, 4 Net-
work in Network (NIN) layers, 10 Max-Feature-Map (MFM) layers,
5 max-pooling layers and 2 fully connected (FC) layers. Our prelim-
inary experiments showed similar performance for MFM and ReLU
activations on the version 2.0 database, therefore we do not use the
Max-Feature-Map layers. We apply 70% and 50% dropouts to the
inputs of the two FC layers respectively. The network has 99.3K free
parameters.
The second CNN system, CNN2, is adapted from [20]. We are
motivated to explore this architecture on the version 2.0 database
since it has a comparatively small number of free parameters (about
11K). It has three Conv layers and two FC layers. Each Conv layer
has 16 output filters/feature maps and uses a small rectangular filter
of 1 × 9 with a stride of 1 × 1 along time and frequency. We apply
a max-pooling operation after each Conv layer. We use 3× 3 kernel
and 3× 3 stride in all max-pooling layers. We use 32 neurons in the
first FC layer with a linear activation and two neurons in the output
layer. We apply 80% and 50% dropouts to the inputs of FC layers to
counter overfitting.
3.3. GMM-based systems
We use two standard short-time spectral features: mel frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) [21] and inverted mel frequency cep-
stral coefficients (IMFCCs) [22] to train a Gaussian Mixture Model
(GMM) backend. We train one GMM for each genuine and spoof
class using the expectation maximization algorithm with random ini-
tialization. We use the MSR-Identity toolkit [23] for implementa-
tion. At test time, for each test utterance a score is obtained using
the log-likelihood ratio:
2The average duration of the training subset is 2.66 sec
3We find a comparable performance for 256,512 and 1024 FFT points
4http://librosa.github.io
Λ(X) = logP (X|θg)− logP (X|θs) (1)
where X is a sequence of feature vectors, P denotes the likelihood
function, θg and θs represents the genuine and spoof GMMs re-
spectively. We develop two GMM systems: GMM1 and GMM2.
GMM1 uses 512 mixture components trained on MFCC features
while GMM2 is trained on IMFCC features with 256 mixture com-
ponents. Both systems use 40 dimensional delta+acceleration (DA)
coefficients.
3.4. SVM-based systems
We do not apply any normalization or voice activity detection to the
MFCC and IMFCC frontends. The same holds true for section 3.3.
We train two utterance-level binary support vector machine
(SVMs) backends using i-vectors [24]. SVM1 is trained using
MFCC i-vectors and SVM2 uses IMFCC i-vectors. We use 40
dimensional DA coefficients (for both MFCC and IMFCC) to
learn the i-vector extractor (also called total variability matrix T )
and the universal background model (UBM). We use the pooled
(train+development) data to train the UBM with 128 mixture com-
ponents and the T matrix with 100 rank. i-vectors are extracted for
the train, development and evaluation subsets and a SVM classifier
with a linear kernel is trained on pooled i-vectors to discriminate a
genuine and a spoof class. SVMs are implemented using Scikit-learn
[25] and the i-vector extractor is trained using the MSR-Identity
toolkit.
3.5. Ensemble systems
We argue that a single feature and a single classifier may not ad-
equately model the diverse spoofing conditions that appear in the
ASVspoof 2017 evaluation subset. To this end, we investigate per-
formance using ensemble approaches which have shown promising
results in version 1.0 ASVspoof 2017 [8] and also on ASVspoof
2015 database (text-to-speech and voice-conversion spoofing at-
tacks) [26, 27]. We build four score-level fusion5 systems using the
linear logistic regression implementation of [16]. Fused1 combines
scores from all the six countermeasures: CNN1, CNN2, GMM1,
GMM2, SVM1 and SVM2. Fused2 combines the GMM1 and
GMM2 scores while Fused3 fuses the scores of the SVM1 and
SVM2 systems. Finally, Fused4 combines the two GMMs and the
two SVMs.
4. RESULTS
Table 2 shows the performance of our systems on the evaluation sub-
set of the ASVspoof 2017 version 2.0 corpus. The original baseline
and the enhanced baseline produces an EER of 23.4% and 12.2% re-
spectively. See [15] and [11] for details on the original and enhanced
baseline results. The end-to-end CNN systems show poor perfor-
mance on the evaluation subset. CNN1 shows an EER of 28.2% and
CNN2 yields an EER of 27.81%. A possible reason for poor gener-
alization might attribute to a small amount (only 2.22 hours) of data
available for training the models. Data augmentation approaches
may help improve generalization.
The IMFCC feature based GMM system (GMM2) shows an
EER of 18.3%, clearly outperforming the MFCC feature based sys-
tem (GMM1) with an EER of 27.8%. We find a similar trend in
performance for i-vector based SVM systems. The SVM2 system
5We use greedy approach for fusion and report the 4 best fused systems.
Table 2. Performance of the baselines, GMMs, SVMs, CNNs and
fused systems on the evaluation subset. Z,S,D,A denote zero, static,
delta and acceleration coefficients.
Id System Features EER%
1 Original baseline [15] 29 ZSDA CQCC 23.4Enhanced baseline [11] 19 E SDA CQCC 12.2
2 CNN1 Spectrograms 28.2CNN2 27.8
3 GMM1 MFCC 27.8GMM2 IMFCC 18.3
4 SVM1 MFCC ivector 24.6SVM2 IMFCC ivector 16.3
5
Fused1 Systems in 2-4 12.3
Fused2 GMM1+GMM2 15.9
Fused3 SVM1+SVM2 11.5
Fused4 Systems in 3-4 11.0
trained on IMFCC-based i-vectors shows an EER of 16.3%, outper-
forming the MFCC-based i-vector system (SVM1) having 24.6%
EER. Thus IMFCCs that emphasize higher frequencies seem to give
better performance over MFCCs in general.
By now, it is quite evident how hard it is for a single countermea-
sure to counter the diverse nature of replay attacks in the evaluation
subset. Thus, we investigate the benefits that these countermeasures
offer as an ensemble system. The first ensemble system, Fused1,
produces an EER of 12.3%, offering about 11% absolute gain over
the original baseline (23.4%) and comparable performance with the
enhanced baseline. The Fused2 system shows an EER of 15.9%
and the Fused3 system an EER of 11.5%. Our best fusion system
Fused4 reports an EER of 11.0% outperforming the original and the
enhanced baselines by an absolute of 13.4% and 1.2%, respectively.
These results suggest that ensemble approaches could be one possi-
ble direction for further investigation.
The results seen so far do not explain what these systems have
learned to make prediction or which factor (AE, PD, RD or RC)
influences the prediction most. Thus, we perform analysis on the
countermeasure performance under different replay conditions in the
next section.
5. ANALYSIS
We compare and analyse the performance of various countermea-
sures under different replay conditions/configurations we high-
lighted in section 2.
5.1. Impact under different quality of AE, RD and PD
We pool all the evaluation subset scores according to low, medium
and high qualitative categories for each factors: acoustic environ-
ment (AE), playback device (PD) and recording device (RD). We do
this for all our systems, except CNN1; as both CNNs show similar
performance, we choose CNN2 for analysis. Results are shown in
Table 3. Note that the number of replayed utterances varies across
different conditions (eg. 9336 for medium quality and 1633 for high
quality acoustic environments) but the number of genuine utterances
remains same6. We make several interesting observations. (1) The
6Evaluation subset has 1298 genuine utterances. Whether we compute
EER for the low AE or high AE the number of genuine utterances is always
1298.
Table 3. Spoofing detection performance (EER%) for different quality of acoustic environments (AE), playback devices (PD) and recording
devices (RD) in the evaluation subset of the ASVspoof 2017 2.0 corpus. Low, medium and high quality indicator has the same meaning as in
section 2. RU indicates replay utterances. Evaluation subset has 1298 genuine utterances. Bold numbers highlight the systems outperforming
the enhanced baseline.
Replay factor Quality # RU Enh. Baseline Fused2 CNN2 GMM1 GMM2 SVM1 SVM2
Acoustic Environment (AE)
Low 1039 16.6 13.3 24.2 13.5 18.8 15.5 20.4
Medium 9336 18.7 11.4 29.2 25.4 18.5 22.2 16.2
High 1633 21.8 14.3 22.3 44.4 16.9 41.3 13.5
Playback device (PD)
Low 4612 16.6 12.9 36.4 18.3 21.9 10.5 21.6
Medium 1568 16.4 9.9 23.9 11.9 16.2 16.4 11.8
High 5828 18.3 11.6 20.7 35.7 14.5 34.8 11.7
Recording device (RD)
Low 5092 10.8 12.2 27.9 22.5 18.4 21.4 17.6
Medium 1592 15.6 10.0 38.6 36.3 16.4 21.7 12.7
High 5324 17.7 12.3 24.5 28.7 18.8 28.2 15.9
Fused2 system outperforms the enhanced baseline under each cat-
egory except for low quality recording devices, indicating that en-
semble approaches does help improve detection performance. (2)
CNN2 shows worse performance compared to the enhanced base-
line. (3) Generally, SVM systems tend to show better performance
over GMMs (with few exceptions in some cases). (4) AE: for the
low quality AE, the MFCC-based system shows better performance
over the IMFCC-based systems. However, we see an opposite trend
for replay attacks using medium and high quality AE. (5) PD: for
the low quality PD, the MFCC-based ivector system SVM1 outper-
forms IMFCC-based systems, but on the medium and high quality
PD, the SVM2 system outperforms the MFCC-based systems. (6)
RD: for all low, medium and high quality RDs, the IMFCC-ivector
based SVM2 system outperforms the MFCC-based systems.
The experiments conducted here make an assumption that while
analysing the influence of one factor say, AE the other two factors
PD and RD have negligible impact. This however is not true because
it is difficult to mask out the information related to RD and PD from
a replayed audio signal. Had this been true, the problem of replay at-
tack would have been easy to solve already. Therefore, we argue that
the results reported here may not be completely insightful to under-
stand a replay spoofing detection system. This leads us to perform
analysis according to different qualities of replay configurations7 in
the next section.
5.2. Impact under different quality of RC
We present the results of RC-wise analysis in Table 4. We consider
three low quality RCs: RC15, RC16 and RC19, three medium qual-
ity RCs: RC30, RC33, RC34 and three high quality RCs: RC55,
RC56 and RC57. It is worth to note that these high quality RCs use
analog wire acoustic conditions, meaning there is no physical sound
propagation and hence are considered to be the most difficult replay
attacks to be detected by a countermeasure.
In general, the fused2 system show the best performance out-
performing the enhanced baseline. Low: Under low quality, we
observe worse performance for CNN2 and IMFCC-feature based
GMM2 and SVM2 systems. Though we expected IMFCC features
to show better performance as they emphasize higher frequency re-
gions which enable capturing ambient noises, we find contradictory
results. The MFCC-based systems show comparable performance
with the enhanced baseline. For RC19, the GMM1 system shows
7Note that the terms: “replay conditions” and “replay configurations” are
used alternatively in the paper. They have the same meaning.
7.0% EER which further reduces to 3.5% for the i-vector based sys-
tem SVM1, clearly outperforming the baseline (10.5%). Medium:
except CNN2 all other systems show comparable or improved per-
formance in comparison to the enhanced baseline. High: For high
quality RCs, the MFCC-features based systems (GMM1 and SVM1)
show worse performance indicating that low frequency information
is not very helpful for discriminating high quality replay attacks.
All other systems including CNN2 clearly outperforms the baseline
for the high quality RCs we investigated. On the RC55 configura-
tion, the GMM2 system shows a remarkable performance of 3.8%,
in comparison to the baseline (15.0%) which further reduces to 3.5%
for the SVM2 system using IMFCC i-vectors.
Overall, we make following observations. Within the context of
ASVspoof 2017 2.0 dataset, (1) MFCCs seem to show better per-
formance for low and medium quality replay attacks. IMFCCs on
the contrary show poor performance in general. This suggests that
information at low frequencies are helpful for detecting low quality
attacks. (2) For the high category (the hardest ones), MFCC show
the worse performance while IMFCC-feature based systems show
superior performance, with the IMFCC+ivector based SVM2 sys-
tem taking the lead. A possible explanation for this could be that
these high quality devices may use low pass filters that mask out
high frequency information in a replayed signal, leaving cues for
discrimination. This hypothesis however needs further investigation
which we look at in our future work.
5.3. Frame-wise energy and log-likelihood analysis
Now we conduct frame-level analysis to see if we can derive any un-
derstanding about what the MFCC and IMFCC feature-based GMM
systems (GMM1 and GMM2) have learned about high quality replay
attacks. For this we look at log energy and log-likelihood distribu-
tions across the frames of the most confidently classified spoof and
genuine audio files under RC558.
Figure 1 shows the energy and log-likelihood distribution plots
across the first 100 frames of genuine and spoof files for GMM2.
For the spoof file E 1005573.wav, the energy distribution across
frames seems to be uniform and smooth. The genuine and spoof
model log-likelihood across the frames show competitive behaviour,
indicating how hard it is to have a clear boundary of discrimination
between genuine and replayed signals. Further, we find that the log-
8Among the three high quality replay attacks (RC55, RC56, RC57) we
analysed, the IMFCC frontend show lowest EER for RC55, so we chose
RC55 for analysis.
Table 4. Performance (EER%) under different quality of replay configurations (RC) in the evaluation subset of the ASVspoof 2017 2.0 corpus.
The baseline numbers (fifth column) are estimated from the Fig. 2 of [11]. The letter E, P, R in the third column denote acoustic environment,
playback device and recording device. Low, medium, high, RU and bold numbers have the same meaning as in Table 3. Evaluation subset
has 1298 genuine utterances.
Replay Quality Id Replay Config. # RU Enh. Baseline Fused2 CNN2 GMM1 GMM2 SVM1 SVM2
Low
RC15 E02 P21 R18 150 8.0 10.7 19.9 8.0 23.2 13.6 24.2
RC16 E02 P21 R14 116 9.0 6.6 21.4 12.5 13.9 13.3 18.0
RC19 E02 P20 R14 120 10.5 8.5 49.9 7.0 23.0 3.5 26.0
Medium
RC30 E15 P19 R20 74 7.0 1.9 16.0 5.5 7.1 6.1 4.1
RC33 E13 P14 R04 183 8.5 5.0 12.3 6.4 8.9 10.5 7.9
RC34 E17 P12 R04 181 9.0 4.3 12.5 5.8 8.5 10.2 7.5
High
RC55 E26 P24 R24 178 15.0 11.0 9.8 42.9 3.8 47.0 3.5
RC56 E25 P13 R08 182 36.0 29.2 22.5 43.4 26.5 48.1 22.1
RC57 E24 P23 R23 183 33.0 27.4 26.6 44.3 26.4 49.6 22.3








































Fig. 1. Left column shows the log energy (top) and log-likelihood
distribution (bottom) across the first 100 frames of the most confi-
dent spoof audio E 1005573.wav in RC55 condition for GMM2.
The column on the right shows the same for the most confident gen-
uine audio fileE 1002092.wav. The blue and orange profile depicts
the genuine and spoof GMM log-likelihood while the green profile
denotes the log-likelihood difference.
likelihood difference (green profile) across the frames seems to be
around zero indicating ambiguity in the decision boundary. How-
ever, on the genuine file E 1002092.wav, we find significant cues
about a genuine class in the first few frames. We find lower energy
for these frames in comparison to remaining frames of the signal.
Further, the spoof model for these frames gives a very low likeli-
hood score indicating that such instances were not seen during spoof
GMM training. As a result, the log likelihood ratio (green profile)
in these frames dominates the other frames in the signal, thus serv-
ing as a key indicator of being genuine. We refer these frames as
outliers. We find 286 genuine files in the training subset, 35 in the
development and 96 in the evaluation subset with such outliers. We
observe a similar trend as in Fig.1 for MFCC-based GMM1 system.
However, we do not include the figures due to space limitations.
From these observations, it appears that these systems are also
using the class-dependent data cues (outliers) found in the genuine
signals as one of the factors for making predictions. However, this
would not be the case if a voice activity detector (VAD) was in
place that would automatically eliminate non-speech frames. But
this is not the case: these countermeasures use both speech and non-
speech frames. Therefore, a realistic-real-world replay countermea-
sure would have to be smart enough to automatically tackle such
outliers during model training and testing and make a reliable pre-
Table 5. Confusion matrix of GMM1 and GMM2 systems for
RC15 (low quality) and RC55 (high quality). G: genuine, S: spoof.
Columns denote ground-truth and rows the predicted.
RC15 (Low) RC55 (High)
G S G S
MFCC+GMM (GMM1) G 1208 22 1208 162S 90 128 90 16
IMFCC+GMM (GMM2) G 1197 116 1197 2S 101 34 101 176
diction.
As we notice from Table 4 (fourth column), the number of re-
play utterances is significantly lesser than genuine utterances (which
is always 1298 for every RC condition), therefore, reported EERs do
not provide significant statistical insights on the correct and incor-
rect classification for the genuine and spoof test utterances. So, we
look at the confusion matrix for RC15 and RC55 using the GMM1
and GMM2 systems to understand the proportion of correct and in-
correct classification. Table 5 shows the resulting confusion ma-
trix. For RC15, GMM1 has high true negative (85.33%) but small
false positive (14.66%) rates while GMM2 shows the opposite trend:
high false positive (77.33%) and small true negative (22.66%) rates.
On RC55, we see an opposite trend in contrast to RC15. Here, the
GMM1 system shows high false positive (91.01%) and low true neg-
ative (8.98%) while GMM2 shows small false positive (1.12%) but
high true negative (98.87%) rates. For genuine cases, both GMM1
and GMM2 show comparable performance (in terms of true posi-
tives and false negatives).
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated and analysed various countermeasures
for replay spoofing detection on the version 2.0 ASVspoof 2017 cor-
pus. We find that the systems using MFCC frontends have a smaller
EER than the systems using IMFCC frontends in the evaluation sub-
set when looking at replay conditions with supposed low quality. We
find the opposite when looking at replay conditions with supposed
high quality. However, gaining in-depth understanding of what is
causing this behaviour seems challenging because the original Red-
Dots [28] corpus of genuine recordings includes both clean and noisy
recordings collected from heterogeneous devices, but lacks docu-
mentation on the meta-data (acoustic conditions, recording devices).
This means that “high-quality spoofing conditions” may actually be
low quality since the genuine files were of low quality and vice-
versa.
Thus, on this dataset it is difficult to perform evaluation on fac-
tors (AE, PD, RD and RC) influencing replay attacks in controlled
conditions and provide significant conclusions whether reverbera-
tion noise or some device-specific (recording or playback) attributes
provide a cue to replay signal discrimination. Further, our analysis
shows that the models also use dataset-specific cues (outliers), found
only in few genuine files but missing in the replayed versions, dur-
ing prediction. Therefore, on this dataset, a reliable replay detector
should automatically take care of such outliers and allow learning
algorithms to exploit only the information related to replay factors
to make a reliable prediction. However, an open question that re-
mains is: (1) What kind of replay attacks can be detectable in the
first place? (2) Is it possible to design a frontend that can automati-
cally tackle these variabilities and uncertainties?
Our future work aims to look into countermeasures that would
automatically tackle such outliers during training and testing. We
will also look at how speech (the ten phrases used in the corpus) and
the speakers influence replay detection on the evaluation subset.
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